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“Nobody talked much as the expedition crossed the moon. There was nothing appropriate to say. 
One thing was clear: Absolutely everybody in the city was supposed to be dead, regardless of 
what they were, and that anybody that moved in it represented a flaw in the design. There were 
to be no moon men at all.” – Slaughterhouse 5 
 
 In an apparent state of shock, President John F. Kennedy listened on to his Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff as he was briefed for the first time on the most complex, most 
consequential, most destructive war plan that a military bureaucracy had ever devised.1 This 
plan, the Single Integrated Operational Plan for fiscal year 1962 (or SIOP-62), was the result of 
15 years of intense deliberation on nuclear theory and its operational application given a wartime 
scenario. Despite the stubbornness of fierce military inter-service infighting and the incalculable 
costs of resources necessary to prepare the military for a global nuclear war, SIOP-62 stood 
before the new President as a triumph of state bureaucracy manifesting national interests into 
reality. Indeed, its contents were unprecedented, and if executed the thermonuclear devastation 
of SIOP-62 would drastically alter the trajectory of human life on planet Earth.2 
 Given a scenario of a “Fully Generated Alert Level,” SIOP-62 planned for the United 
States military to detonate 3267 atomic and thermonuclear weapons spanning from the industrial 
centers of Eastern Europe to coastal Chinese cities in the Pacific. At its maximum, this 
coordinated air-atomic behemoth would release 7.420 gigatons of nuclear energy across the 
Eurasian landmass in virtually simultaneous form, making massive swaths of land uninhabitable 
for the immeasurable future.3 SIOP-62 called for over 200,000 times more nuclear force than the 
                                                          
1 A much more thorough report on the Kennedy’s reaction to SIOP-62 can be found here: Sagan, Scott D. "SIOP-62: 
The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy." International Security 12.1 (1987): 22. Web. 
2 To dig deeper on the potential atmospheric hazards of nuclear exchange, see: Robock, Alan. "Nuclear 
Winter." Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 1.3 (2010): 418-27. Web. 
3 Sagan, Scott D. "SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy." International Security 12.1 
(1987): 22. Web. Also to see the Strategic Air Command’s official history on the evolution of nuclear operations 
through SIOP-62 see “History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff: Bacground and Preparation of SIOP-62” 
which can be found in digital form on the National Security Archives “Nuclear History” page. 
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combined bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II. Tabulating a precise casualty 
rate is difficult, but with what declassified estimates are publicly available, the total casualties of 
Sino-Soviet bloc conservatively amounted to 285 million immediate deaths.4 These estimates did 
not consider though casualties caused by firestorms, radioactive fallout, international food 
scarcity, or long-term atmospheric alterations, which would inevitably result in the death of 
millions more globally. The design of SIOP-62 demanded that each category of targeting was 
inseparable from the overall strategy. In essence it was either to be implemented in full or not at 
all. 
 The targeting selection process for SIOP-62 was far from arbitrary. Led by lieutenant 
General Hickey, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council conducted a 
study which would become known as Study No. 2009 charged with the purpose of evaluating 
what type of targeting strategy would be most likely to meet policy objectives. The 
subcommittee came to the conclusion that targeting should be an “Optimum mix” of military and 
urban-industrial targets. Therefore, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (charged with target 
selection for SIOP-62) could use discretion as to what it perceived to be the most advantageous 
of both military as well as urban-industrial targets to bring Soviet military capacities to a halt and 
ensure the survival of the United States.5 The approved guidance stated that each target must 
meet a minimum of 75 percent chance of destruction regardless of target priority.6 Through 
strategic air bombers and ballistic missiles (launched from both land outposts as well as 
                                                          
4 Sagan, Scott D. "SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy." International Security 12.1 
(1987): 22. 
5 Andreopoulos, George J., Michael Eliot Howard, and Mark R. Shulman. "Chapter 10 -- Nuclear War 
Planning." The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World. New Haven ; London: Yale UP, 1997. 
160-77. Print. 
6 Sagan, Scott D. "SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy." International Security 12.1 
(1987): 22. Print. 
4 
 
submarines) simultaneous launching of the US nuclear arsenal was designed to overwhelm 
Soviet defenses, assure the greatest extent of delivery success, and provide a relatively larger 
degree of safety to the bombing teams above Soviet skies. All of these factors ensured hyper-
redundancy measures be in place by operational planners. Whether they were necessities or 
excesses depended on who was being asked, but critical members within the Kennedy 
administration found them to be excessive. 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had been briefed on SIOP-62 in early February 
and had since sought to prepare an alternative for the moment when President Kennedy would be 
made aware of this plan.7 McNamara abhorred its inflexible nature, the redundancy of its 
bombardment tactics, and the whimsical attitude of its creators. “That was the crux of SIOP,” 
wrote nuclear historian Fred Kaplan, “a first-strike plan that held back nothing, that killed 
hundreds of millions of people just because they lived under Communist rule, without any 
Communist government’s having so much as scratched a square inch of the United States. As 
much as anyone else who had witnessed this spectacle, if not more so, Robert McNamara was 
horrified.”8 As one who was skeptical of the assessments military officials offered for their own 
objective requirements, McNamara set off to tame the aggression within the strategies these 
nuclear planners had set forth under Eisenhower. 
It did not take long for McNamara to convince the president that any nuclear plan should 
be flexible enough to accommodate for the unique circumstances of a potential nuclear scenario. 
The Kennedy family trusted McNamara. In fact, President Kennedy’s brother, Robert Kennedy 
once remarked, “Bob McNamara is the most dangerous man in the Cabinet because he is so 
                                                          
7 Kaplan, Fred M. The Wizards of Armageddon. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1991. Print.  
8 Ibid. 
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persuasive and articulate.”9 President Kennedy shared McNamara’s distaste for the present 
direction of nuclear operational planning and trusted that he could correct the issue. So, with the 
approval of Kennedy, McNamara quickly began an effort to restructure the rigidity of the SIOP-
62, and in 1963, McNamara presented President Kennedy with the SIOP-63 which contained 
more options of nuclear attack if an escalation of general conflict were to ever arise. 
McNamara’s plan unwound nuclear targets from non-nuclear military targets and urban-
industrial targets, allowing the president the flexibility to withhold attack on higher population 
centers, and the plan provided the president five primary attack options—determined by the 
imminence of the threat—from which, hopefully, he would never have to choose.10 
This deviation from the established Eisenhower nuclear policy of massive retaliation 
became known as “flexible response.” Massive retaliation was a strategy whereby the nation’s 
nuclear arsenal would only be used all at once and in its totality if provoked by unacceptable 
Soviet aggression. Flexible response attempted to offer less apocalyptic uses of the weapon. It 
was to be the trademark of the Kennedy administration’s imprint on nuclear policy and it was 
perceived by some as a sensible backing away from the brink of the thermonuclear edge. 
Intuitively, this change in national policy felt safer. If the Soviet Union was to annex West 
Berlin, an immediate and unflinching emptying of the entire U.S. nuclear arsenal seems 
excessive at best, maniacal at worst. But the temporary victory of flexible response as U.S. 
policy over massive retaliation does not suggest some judicious civilian victory over the 
thoughtless excesses of military officialdom nor does it necessarily even make the brandishing of 
nuclear arsenals between the United States and Soviet Union any less dangerous.  
                                                          
9 Kaplan, Fred M. The Wizards of Armageddon. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1991. Print. 
10 Sagan, Scott D. "SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy." International Security 12.1 
(1987): 22. Print. 
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McNamara and Kennedy’s logic ignores one looming reality: nuclear attack is, by nature, 
indiscriminate. A targeting plan which distinguishes civilian from combatant, innocent from 
hostile, bystander from threat requires nuclear weaponry not be used. The close proximity of 
military outposts and weapon systems with high population areas raises significant doubt as to 
whether Soviet leaders would even be able to discern a “military only” attack from one which 
fully integrates urban-industrial centers alongside military targets.11 In his defense of SIOP-62, 
JCS Chairman General Lemnitzer stated: “limiting attack to military targets has little practical 
meaning as a humanitarian measure.”12 The size and scope of nuclear capability by the early 
1960’s negated any perceived ethical benefit from an easing of target destruction. Furthermore, if 
left unused, it would be likely that most, if not all, of the remaining U.S. arsenal would be 
destroyed by Soviet retaliation, leaving the U.S. military with no meaningful response with 
which to engage in further offensive action. Even if some were left intact, communication 
systems would surely be down, leaving regional command posts isolated to guess whether or not 
their superiors desired further nuclear deployment.13 
 Furthermore, flexible response also ushered in the worry that the limited or tactical use 
of nuclear weapons would significantly lower the threshold from which these weapons were 
used. In a sense, this policy might have normalized nuclear warfare and increased the likelihood 
that small nuclear weapons be used on peripheral locations or placed strategically in battlefield 
scenarios. How the USSR would respond to any nuclear bombardment was conjecture. A low 
barrier to initial use could potentially lead to a rapid escalation of hostilities ending in a complete 
                                                          
11  Briefing for the President, SIOP-62. 
12 Sagan, Scott D. "SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy." International Security 12.1 
(1987): 22. Print. 
13 Ibid. 
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nuclear exchange that otherwise would not have taken place. This argument suggests that greater 
flexibility might inadvertently have increased the chance of a massive nuclear exchange. 
It is as if McNamara and Kennedy believed the Eisenhower administration had neglected 
to consider all alternatives by which they might pursue nuclear policy. In fact, nuclear thinkers in 
the Eisenhower years had been the most entrepreneurial under any administration prior or since. 
As Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Eisenhower had 
far more experience with nuclear operations than any preceding president to date. Yet the 
attitude of his subsequent administration seemed to disregard the years of strategic thinking that 
had allowed for an operational plan like SIOP-62 to become possible. 
 Despite its ambitions, flexible response would not remain national policy for long. The 
entire concept rested upon two major assumption. First that nuclear war could be limited—in 
other words the detonation of one or several nuclear weapons would not necessarily prompt the 
launching of all Soviet nuclear arms. As previously discussed, this was a reasonably doubtful 
assessment. And secondly, that funding civil and military defense apparatuses could keep US 
population and industrial levels intact. But as arsenals continued to grow rapidly in the early 
1960’s, the numbers just did not seem to suggest that could be possible. 
“The calculations revealed that damage-limiting was a fairly hopeless strategy. […] 
Under certain conditions, damage-limiting could make a difference of up to 55 or 60 
percent in the amount of US industry surviving a Soviet attack. However, if the Soviets 
reacted by expanding their own offensive forces, they could completely nullify the 
damage-limiting measures—and moreover, do so far more cheaply than it would take for 
the United States to limit damage yet again. In the race between offense and defense, 
offense would win, and at lower cost.”14 
                                                          
14 Kaplan, Fred M. The Wizards of Armageddon. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1991. Print. 
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What alternations of SIOP-62 McNamara proposed, from a larger picture, did not change the 
nature of state nuclear behavior. An intolerable number of nuclear weapons would be launched 
that would kill millions in the event of nuclear conflict with the USSR. By 1964, Secretary 
McNamara came around to supporting Assured Destruction—which was more or less the policy 
that had been in place under Eisenhower. The hope that nuclear weapons could be utilized in a 
circumstance that would not wreak intolerable destruction upon the state was dead. 
This juxtaposition of SIOP-62 and its horrific consequences against the legitimate 
critiques of flexible response illustrates the paradox of nuclear capability. With the advent of 
nuclear armed states, what could be defined in a wartime scenario as a military victory for the 
first time became incongruous with a political victory. What nuclear tacticians developed within 
their war plans could no longer satisfy the objectives of the civilian leadership for whom they 
took orders. The ultimate aim of SIOP-62 was not that it be used to successfully win a war, but 
that through preparation for nuclear conflict, such a war might be deterred. Therefore, by 
examining what these plans detailed, this gap in military-civilian objectives can be best 
understood. 
As McNamara sought to reform SIOP, a sharply worded Kennedy administration memo 
articulated his frustrations succinctly: “SIOP-62 is a rigid, all-purpose plan, designed for 
execution in existing form, regardless of circumstances. Rigidity stems from … [the] … Belief 
that winning general war means coming out relatively better than USSR, regardless of magnitude 
of losses.”15 The criticism of relative victory regardless of magnitude is legitimate, but not one 
that would keep a state from engaging in future warfare. McNamara realized that what 
                                                          
15 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy. 43. Memorandum 
From the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy. Washington, September 19, 1961. 
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differentiated a U.S.-Soviet war in 1961 from the Eastern Front of World War II was whether a 
nation would be left to rebuild. Even the declared “victor” of a thermonuclear war would have no 
real nation left to govern. It would be paralyzed to affect any real measure of power over what 
population remained. His actions reflected a larger urge by any state of nuclear capability to 
mold nuclear capacities into something that can be managed—an urge that was futile. 
While those at the nuclear mantle throughout the 1950s gradually came to the realization 
of what a nuclear war would and must entail, Kennedy and McNamara’s reactions to the SIOP-
62 briefing are so telling because the gravity of this capability was bestowed upon them all at 
once. Those preceding the Kennedy administration did not inherent an atomic arsenal capable of 
tossing missiles of international decimation through the air. They were the gradual inventors of 
it. McNamara and Kennedy’s shocked reaction to massive retaliation was not experienced by 
earlier officials because for them the consequences of nuclear exchange were a much more 
gradual realization. In this historical moment, we confront the quandary of nuclear weapons. 
They deter aggression through the threat of genocide. Yet no rational government could imagine 
benefit from their use. Nuclear weapons placed states in a quandary of geopolitical interests and 
perceptions of insecurity that persists under the pretense of irrationality. 
This thesis lays out the atomic framework, beginning in the late 1940’s under President 
Truman through the opening days of the Kennedy administration, from which nuclear thinking 
developed. It explores the nebulous relationship between official policy and operational 
planning, which so often only reluctantly coincided. In section one, this paper discusses the 
multiplicity of ideas suggested by policy officials and operational orchestrators alike in order to 
contextualize how massive retaliation became the most advantageous nuclear alternative. Its 
describes the dialogue surrounding the objective of deterrence and how it might be satisfied 
10 
 
through a variety of nuclear means. Section 2 discusses how massive retaliation and, in turn, 
assured destruction continued to be the principal nuclear strategy. The quest to prevail became 
mired by the means which prevailing demanded. Estimated casualty numbers rose quietly from 
the millions of casualties taking months in a wartime scenario to the hundreds of millions taking 
days, if not hours. In only a decade, nuclear arms went from the key centerpiece of U.S. military 
force against Soviet expansionism to an institutionalized system capable of jeopardizing human 
habitation on this planet. U.S. policymakers eventually came to this realization and attempted to 
grapple with genocidal and self-compromising implications. 
This thesis broadens the U.S. Cold War nuclear dialogue beyond the interactions of high-
level men or rivalling agencies. By centering my argument in the quandaries of interest 
bedeviling government leaders, I stress how nuclear armament restructured the fundamental 
behavior of states: their interests and the actions taken to achieve those ends. McNamara’s urge 
to seek a nuclear strategy other than massive retaliation was not the first attempt to do so by 
policymakers. This thesis will explore those options, weigh their strengths and weaknesses, and 
explain how massive retaliation proved more resilient than other nuclear alternatives. I argue that 
nuclear capability was more than a tool in achieving state interests, but itself transformed what 
United States officials perceived their interests to be. By doing so, I decenter the Cold War as the 
functional form by which we discuss nuclear armament—even as my study exists within the 
Cold War geopolitical moment. 
Through the deliberation of several nuclear alternatives and the rationalization of why the 
United States always returned to massive retaliation, I emphasize how the logical problems of 
nuclear deterrence transcend that of merely the Cold War, but as an ongoing and ever-expanding 
force in shaping state behavior both in terms of domestic and international. The conundrum in 
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which McNamara found himself in 1961 is a powerful anecdote in explaining the complex web 
of state interests and nuclear capability which I define as “Our Nuclear Quandary.” Acting 
rationally, he still could not come to a satisfactory alternative to massive retaliation and 
reluctantly returned US nuclear strategy back to the framework provided under Truman and 
Eisenhower. This thesis will depict the alternatives other US officials considered and how the 
policy of massive retaliation emerged, gained broad acceptance, and matured into the concept we 
now know as assured destruction. Ultimately, I use these deliberations of nuclear capability to 
dig into a deeper question: Can a world governed by states reach in the atomic age reach any 
nuclear alternative that would not result in the destruction of global human habitation? And if 
not, how do we proceed forward? 
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Chapter 1 – The Alternatives 
 
“War does not consist of a single instantaneous blow.” – Carl von Clausewitz 
 
 Carl von Clausewitz’s seminal work On War has long been a foundational text within the 
educational institutions of the US military. The nuclear strategists emerging from the post-World 
War II era were well versed in his ideas on the function of war and why states chose to engage in 
this most violent act. His first chapter laid out before them 28 fundamental “truths” of war—one 
of them being: “war does not consist of a single instantaneous blow.”16 But as these 20th century 
strategists ruminated in the chilling atmosphere of a global Cold War, they gradually found many 
of von Clausewitz’s proverbs to be less and less applicable. In a matter of approximately a 
decade, war had unraveled from the neat order of Clausewitzean traditionalism to something far 
more sinister and unprecedented. By the turn of the decade, the potential for global war had in 
fact became an instantaneous act—decided within hours instead of years. I include this epigraph 
as a reminder to myself and any readers that alternatives considered and the opinions held 
throughout this tumultuous area must be contextualized in their moment, not ours. Truly no 
preconceived manual, nor strategy, nor philosophical text convenienced the “Wizards of 
Armageddon”17 as they set forth a new structure of thought from which we now frame our 
considerations of war. 
United States nuclear dialogue in the founding years of the Cold War centered upon two 
fundamental questions. First, how might the US deter the Soviet Union from expanding 
                                                          
16 Carl von. Clausewitz, On War. Penguin, 1968. Print. 
17 For a comprehensive narrative on the intellectual background of those who cultivated early Cold War foreign 
policy thought read Fred Kaplan’s “Wizards of Armageddon.” Kaplan, Fred M. The Wizards of Armageddon. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1991. Print. 
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substantial influence into key regions of US interest? And two, if Soviet expansion cannot be 
deterred, how might the United States prevail in the event of a general conflict? Despite a variety 
of ideas crafted by the nuclear thinkers of the day, no serious discussion deviated from satisfying 
these objectives. Within these two questions though, nuclear weapons took on two distinct 
functions: to prevent war on the one hand and to ensure a wartime victory on the other. 
Intuitively, it is fairly simple to see how the eventual disconnect between political and military 
objectives came to be so wide. This section explores the various alternatives policymakers 
considered to best balance the two. While not every “nuclear innovation” is considered in this 
chapter nor every significant document for the ones presented, this section provides a basic 
understanding of the dynamism of early Cold War strategies in their diversity of potential policy 
solutions. Government officialdom was not stagnant. It deliberated a plethora of alternatives 
regarding nuclear behavior. This reality makes their eventual nuclear conclusion that much more 
telling as to how state interests are shaped and how far states are willing to maintain these 
interests. 
 
** ** Symmetrical & Superior Mobilization ** ** 
 
In the late 1940’s and early ‘50’s, the United States was still coming to terms with its new 
adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union. Changing global political circumstances 
necessitated changes in policy options to follow suit. What I have dubbed “symmetrical & 
superior mobilization” was one of those policies, which for a brief moment was adopted by 
President Truman as official policy. Symmetrical and superior mobilization is a geopolitical 
14 
 
strategy where at ever avenue a nation’s adversary may gain a strategic advantage, the nation in 
question meets it with equal or greater military capability. In no branch of military or civilian 
service would the nation allow its adversary to have numerical or technological advantage, and 
also insist that in several, it maintain a clear advantage. Given an environment of insecurity, the 
US officials fell susceptible to this policy, if only briefly, as they adjusted to the US’s new 
international tension with the communist sphere. 
 
NSC 68 
 
Between 1949 and 1950, a slew of unexpected military actions in Eurasia caused U.S. 
officials to reevaluate the rather cautious US foreign policy that had existed since the end of 
World War II. The victory of the Chinese Communist Party over the Guomindang in China, the 
detonation of a thermonuclear device by the Soviets, and, most importantly, the outbreak of the 
Korean War produced a sense of insecurity in the U.S. that would result in a significant 
repositioning of U.S. global strategy.18  The Truman administration viewed the Communist 
world to be increasingly aggressive and an imminent threat to American hegemony in the 
postwar world. It is in this context that in 1950 President Truman adopted NSC-68 as official 
U.S. policy—believing every advance of communist influence must be met with an equal or 
greater force from the Western sphere. 
                                                          
18 Interpretation elaborated in: Holloway, David. "18 -- Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War, 1945-
1962." The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 1. Cambridge UP, 2010. 376-97. Print. 
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NSC-68 merged Communist policy and atomic policy into the same document—which 
had previously necessitated separate, if overlapping, consideration. This document recognized 
the intersectionality of the Communist threat and nuclear armament, and it advised an immediate 
and wholesale expansion of the non-nuclear branches of the military. NSC-68 envisioned an 
expanded nuclear stockpile but it also intended to walk back U.S. geopolitical dependence upon 
a nuclear deterrent—seeing such a strategy as ultimately inadequate. “In time the atomic 
capability of the U.S.S.R. can be expected to grow to a point where, given surprise and no more 
effective opposition than we now have programmed, the possibility of a decisive initial attack 
cannot be excluded.”19  Essentially, this document assessed the objectives of prior US foreign 
policy—which feared fiscal ruin of military buildup swelled to unsustainable proportions—to be 
inadequate for achieving a sound Soviet deterrent. NSC-68 evaluated Soviet progress in 
nuclearization and deemed that by 1954 a surprise nuclear attack by the Soviets would wreak 
unacceptable damage upon the United States. Despite the fact that U.S. capability could inflict 
similar, if not more, damage upon the Soviet sphere, it assessed that while a “moral” nation like 
the United States might be hesitant to initiate an unprovoked and whole-scale attack, the Soviet 
Union could not be trusted to do the same. Therefore, the project of deterrence must expand 
beyond air power and atomic dominance. Only a total military buildup, it argued, could prevent 
such an attack from occurring.20 
The ultimate objective of NSC-68 though was the same as previous nuclear strategy—the 
relative reduction of the Soviet’s power and influence, which was deemed a threat to peace and 
global stability. What differentiated NSC-68 from prior official policies is its assessment of 
                                                          
19 US National Security Council, “NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” April 14, 
1950. 
20 Ibid. 
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resources needed and the immediacy of their utilization to ensure that these objectives were 
successfully met. NSC-68 rationalized a hurried implementation of military-industrial strength, 
proposing an expansion of every avenue of military force— “air, ground, and sea strength, 
atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defenses.”21  The approval of this policy by the Truman 
administration admitted the inability, or unwillingness, to pursue armament reduction strategies. 
It depicted the Soviet regime as calculating, opportunistic, and only responsive to force. 
Therefore, it concluded that the United States must provide force—in every sense of the word—
to contain and negate Communist encroachment. No caution must be taken, no expense withheld 
to combat the United States’ most formidable adversary. This document’s power rested in its 
grave assessment: the conflict which the U.S. found itself in was one in which “the survival of 
the free world is at stake.”22  Therefore, it could demand any sacrifice, consider all alternatives in 
order to ensure the survivability of the the state. 
  More so than any other alternative nuclear policies discussed in this chapter, 
NSC-68 and its call for superior mobilization was the most seriously considered policy until the 
achievement of nuclear parity. The importance of NSC-68 was not its long-lasting administrative 
approval. In fact, President Eisenhower would insist policy reassessment at the beginning of his 
administration only 3 years later. NSC-68 was a watershed moment in U.S. Cold War policy 
because of how it reshaped presidential and congressional perceptions of American interests 
beyond its borders. It emphasized the necessity for the U.S. to be an undoubted “global 
guarantor”23 to the free world. While previous NSC directives allowed for geopolitical margin, 
                                                          
21 US National Security Council, “NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” April 14, 
1950. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Worley, D. Robert. Orchestrating the Instruments of Power: A Critical Examination of the U.S. National Security 
System. Lincoln: Potomac, an Imprint of the U of Nebraska, 2015. Print. 
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NSC-68 concluded that any advancement by the Soviet hegemonic sphere would be in direct 
defiance to American global interest. It states: “any substantial further extension of the area 
under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to 
confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled.”24  NSC-68 also determined that 
any failure in achieving an eventual international control of atomic energy was a failure of Soviet 
accommodation. This document provided no discussion as to how the United States would 
equally engage in compromise to achieve such ends. It concluded that “it is impossible to hope 
than an effective plan for international control can be negotiated unless and until the Kremlin 
design has been frustrated to a point at which a genuine and drastic change in Soviet policies has 
taken place.”25  Essentially, this document did not take seriously the option of a jointly 
recognized international authority to oversee atomic energy. NSC-68 organized the world into 
two mutually incompatible camps—pro-democratic and pro-communist—denying any 
semblance of nuance or of legitimate diplomatic dialogue. Despite its brevity of official 
approval, it removed the lid on congressional military funds for decades to come and it left an 
expectation upon several presidential administrations that no inch of influence—no matter how 
peripheral the country or how unthreatening its capacities may be—nothing could be forfeited to 
any communist regime. 
The effects of the Korean War necessitate a brief digression to discuss its relationship 
with NSC-68. Beginning in 1950, real military purchases increased from $59.8 billion USD to 
$189.2 billion USD in 1953, the years of the war’s end.26  Certainly, to argue that the influence 
                                                          
24 US National Security Council, “NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” April 14, 
1950 
25 Ibid. 
26 Figures for 1948-86 computed from nominal-dollar purchases and GNP deflator in Council of Economic 
Advisers, Annual Report (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1987), pp. 245-48. 
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of NSC-68 objectives was the decisive factor in this mobilization would be absurd. Yet after the 
Korean armistice had been signed, military budgets only slightly decreased from their mobilized 
peak in 1953. Throughout the 1950’s real military purchases remained steady at around $150 
billion USD—only around 20% lower than the wartime peak and over 250% the budget of 
1950.27 For this reason, I argue that the national objectives as stated in NSC-68 held a long-
lasting influence on the nature of governmental Cold War paradigms. The Korean War “proved” 
(to the perception of many) NSC-68’s tone of urgency and imminence, even if its conclusions 
were unsustainable. This coupling of the Korean War and NSC-68 inculcated the military 
apparatuses of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations with a unending sense of tacit 
anxiety. With only minor fluctuations in the post-Korean military budgets, nuclear stockpiles 
rose from 369 weapons in 1950 to 27,000 by 196228—far above their Soviet counterparts and 
based in the assumption that relative military superiority provided the most viable option for 
long-term security. 
Still, administrative officials continually feared a loss of atomic supremacy. John Lewis 
Gaddis, an historian of Cold War history, summed up NSC-68 thusly: “Beginning with a 
perception of implacable threat and expandable means, [NSC-68] derived a set of interests so 
vast as to be beyond the nation’s political will, if not theoretical capacity, to sustain.”29  The 
reoccurring insecurity evident in American foreign and nuclear policy throughout the Cold War 
can trace their origins back to this NSC directive. By questioning the long-term survivability of 
the United States, NSC-68 drove U.S. officials to conclude that an examination of the deeper, 
                                                          
27 Higgs, Robert. "U.S. Military Spending In The Cold War Era: Opportunity Costs, Foreign Crises, and Domestic 
Constraints." Cato Institute (1987): Oxford University Press, 30 Nov. 1988. Web. 
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moral consequences of military expansionism would be a futile endeavor. Fear was the 
foundational tenet of superior mobilization. It demanded the prioritization of military strength 
above all other considerations because it placed national demise as mobilization’s singular 
alternative. While this policy did not garner large enough support to be sustained throughout the 
era of nuclear stockpiling, the anxieties it induced persisted long after nuclear parity was 
reached. 
 
 
** ** The Prevent Strike Temptation ** ** 
 
 As weapon systems and mutual distrust gradually built between the United States and the 
Soviet Union throughout the 1950’s, so too did the allure of a first strike option. The fear of an 
obsolete nuclear arsenal caused by an unexpected Soviet nuclear strike situated the first strike 
concept for some US officials as a tempting possibility. Needless to say, neither the US nor the 
USSR enacted this alternative as official policy, but nevertheless the deliberation of its merits is 
worth consideration. Why it was considered, in what circumstances, and how it never came to be 
implemented are necessary questions to discuss in order to better understand how a nuclear state 
behaved during the Cold War and how it perceived its interests and threats to those interests. 
This section will discuss the study “Project Control” as a catch all in understanding the broader 
arguments for prevents strikes—as many others did exist. The anxieties surrounding this moment 
in nuclear posturing are telling as to what motivates a state to consider a first nuclear strike. 
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Project Control – 1953 
 
Test-confirmed atomic capability had existed in the United States since 1945. The 
Soviets followed suit shortly thereafter in 1949. While atomic power was certainly menacing in 
its own right, but before the invention of thermonuclear capability, atomic arsenals and the inputs 
required for them were viewed as a highly scarce resource. Without the invention of the 
thermonuclear (or hydrogen) bomb, atomic arsenals could, at their greatest, only maintain a 
fraction of the arsenals seen at the height of nuclear stockpiling in the 1960’s. This was due to 
the limited occurrence of radioactive minerals in the natural world—specific isotopes of uranium 
and plutonium—capable of facilitating the nuclear chain-reaction for fission to occur. But the 
theoretical concept of a fusion-based (thermonuclear) weapon would both yield far greater 
explosive capabilities as well as remove the scarcity limits for weapons production. On the basis 
of this technological achievement alone, the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race drove arsenals into 
the tens of thousands of weapons within a matter of years. 
In 1952, perceiving a formidable and continually strengthened foe in the USSR and its 
Communist allies, the United States detonated its first thermonuclear device. Not to be outdone 
and to the astonishment of many, the Soviet Union detonated its first semi-thermonuclear 
weapon only 10 months later. Thus began an exponential scramble to acquire the most menacing 
arsenals and the most allusive means of transporting them. These developments transformed the 
landscape of deterrence. While relative military superiority had played a role in military 
deterrence since as early as 1945, never had it become so acute as it was upon the emergence of a 
circumstance of two, dueling thermonuclear states. US officials recognized the necessity of 
21 
 
relative strength and some came to the conclusion that preventive action was necessary to ensure 
US advantage was never to be lost. 
These anxieties are evident in a major study conducted by the Air Force College in 1953-
54, titled “Project Control.” This study stated that in its current technological state, the US Air 
Force could seize Soviet airspace and attempt to coerce state behavior towards US interests. If 
non-violent measures could not achieve these ends, Project Control called for escalated “air 
pressure” involving strategic military targeting and potentially general warfare. The study 
concluded that the United States through air dominance could neutralize an attempted Soviet 
offensive through counteroffensive measures—wiping out key military targets primarily focused 
on Soviet long-range capabilities—but that this was not its first objective.30 The study was both 
audacious in its assessment of what the Air Force was capable of accomplishing as well as 
insistent in its determination of how quickly such a policy must be put into place.31 
This thesis considers several wartime plans throughout the Truman, Eisenhower, and 
Kennedy administrations given a hypothetical breakout of war, but Project Control is not one of 
those. For one, this plan came from an unconventional source of legitimately debated policy and 
operational planning. This document originated in the Air Force College before making its way 
into the upper echelons of Air Force command and beyond into broader circles of policy 
decision-making.32 Secondly, this was not merely a responsive plan to unpredictable conflict 
escalation, but a call for such escalation on the part of the United States—and to do so 
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immediately. While controversial, this call for preventive action had vocal support even within 
the JCS. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, was a staunch 
proponent of Project Control. Upon being briefed of its proposals he stated: “If the US did not 
adopt and successfully follow through on a course of action similar to Project Control that in the 
period mid 1957-1960 there would be either an all-out atomic war or the US would be forced 
into an agreement which would mean victory for the USSR.”33 Clearly, an attitude of nuclear 
urgency took root in the minds of some military, if not also civilian, officials. Without the 
resolve to act decisively, some feared that the eventual nuclear stalemate, correctly predicted by 
state officials, could galvanize Soviet political disposition into an increasingly aggressive 
demeanor. NSC & JSC memorandums are littered with predictions of dark future days where the 
United States would be given its most feared dilemma: global retraction from the world’s most 
contentious events or acceptance of nuclear war. Avoiding this ultimatum was the main 
motivation behind calls for proactive measures. While not explicitly using the term “preventive,” 
the language Admiral Radford and the JCS put forth before the National Security Council 
implied such actions. Often the words “dynamic” or “positive” were used instead in order to not 
directly confront the president’s established policy that preventive war not be used, but this 
strategically placed language was code for military action. One JSC memorandum in November 
of 1954 exemplifies this circuitous language well: 
The non-Communist world, if it takes positive and timely dynamic countermeasures, 
presently has ample resource to meet this situation, and with high change of maintaining 
world peace without sacrifice of either vital security interests or fundamental moral 
principles, or in the event of war being forced upon it, of winning that war beyond any 
reasonable doubt. On the other hand, failure on the part of the free world and particularly 
of the United States to take such timely and dynamic action could, within a relatively 
short span of years, result in the United States finding itself isolated from the rest of the 
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free world and thus placed in such jeopardy as to reduce its freedom of action to two 
alternatives—that of accommodation to Soviet designs or contesting such designs under 
conditions not favorable to our success.34 
Such indirect language was employed by officials in favor of preventive strikes, rather 
than explicitly demanding such actions be taken—a demand in contradiction with the 
Commander-in-Chief’s official policy. Locating recorded documentation advocating for 
preventive action is difficult, but this should not be interpreted as though its existence was 
tenuous. As David Alan Rosenberg put it: “Although seldom explicitly discussed in writing, 
preventive war was implicit in some of the major policy deliberations of the time.”35 Language 
and tone became often the means of supporting preventive action rather than explicit verbiage. 
Overt support for preventive action was too controversial of a stance to be debated outside the 
shadows of ambiguity. 
This is not to say though that Eisenhower was resolutely against preventive attack from 
the outset of his administration until the end. Several sources have him quoted throughout his 
administration as giving preventive action serious consideration.36 But never did the National 
Security Council feel as if this ultimate nuclear posturing was necessary—that is the more innate 
mechanisms of the state did not ever reach a plurality of consensus that preventive action was the 
most advantageous route. Indeed, the BNSP update of 1956 unambiguously rejected preventive 
action: “The initiation by the United States of preventive war to reduce Soviet or Chinese 
Communist military power is not an acceptable course either to the United States or its major 
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36 A good overview on the various nuclear considerations of Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy: Holloway, David. 
"Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War, 1945â“1962." The Cambridge History of the Cold 
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allies.”37 Upon the achievement of nuclear parity this debate subsided, yet the discussion of 
whether preventive action in more regional geopolitical circumstances still remains. 
 
 
** ** The Argument for Finite Deterrence ** ** 
 
 The emergence of finite deterrence in the late 1950’s as a viable policy alternative can be 
explained in terms of technological advancement in ballistic missile systems, genuine interest in 
slowing the seemingly exponential growth of the US nuclear arsenal, and the organizational 
interests of the Navy in absorbing nuclear control away from the Air Force’s monopoly . Navy 
officials hypothesized a diminishing utility of deterrence in regards to nuclear weaponry as 
stockpiles grew, and therefore, a theoretical maximum to the number of useful weapons needed 
to deter the Soviet Union from a first strike possibility. This theory was expressed in their 
concept of “finite deterrence.” Finite deterrence attempted to frustrate the established Air Force 
planning procedure of targeting Soviet military outposts, called “counterforce” targets, which Air 
Force officials argued was necessary in order to maintain the possibility of a first strike victory. 
But this strategy also meant that the greater number of military outposts, the greater number of 
weapons needed to neutralize the potential enemy threat which continued down a vicious and 
fiscally irresponsible cycle—hence the Navy’s criticism of what they deemed to be “infinite” 
deterrence. Their theory of finite deterrence supposed that given a sizable, but finite, number of 
weapons prepared to strike via mass bomber raids, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 
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and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) spanning so great an expanse of geography 
in such inconspicuous delivery systems, no Soviet attack could destroy the bulk of the US 
nuclear arsenal. This would mean that US would always maintain the capability of launching a 
retaliatory attack of such strength that the Soviets would deem its impact to be intolerable, hence 
reaching a state of deterrence. 
It is of little surprise though that advocates and opponents regarding this idea fell sharply 
along organizational lines—the Navy and Army for and the Air Force against. If implemented, 
this policy would substantially boost Naval prominence in implementing the national nuclear 
agenda. The emergence of the Polaris program in the late ‘1950’s and early ‘1960’s—a naval 
program which outfitted US submarines with nuclear-capable ballistic missiles—was a key 
component in ensuring the success of finite deterrence. Submarines were nearly impossible to 
track regularly while high-altitude aircraft or satellite reconnaissance could locate many of the 
land-based nuclear deployment outposts. Therefore, capping the requirement of nuclear arms 
would end the Air Force’s long-enjoyed position as the chief vehicle of nuclear transportation. 
The preponderance of SAC (the Strategic Air Command charged with transporting the bulk of 
nuclear weapons to their designated targets) would be greatly reduced and the prestige of the 
entire Air Force military branch would be diminished—eclipsed by the latest advances in 
submarine technology. In sum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not weigh each alternative, especially 
finite deterrence, disinterestedly. The prestige of their respective occupational branch was at 
stake. 
Finite deterrence by no means was certainly not without controversy, and Air Force 
officials did all that they could to highlight its drawbacks. For one, it admitted that nuclear war 
could not be won, instead asserting that “sufficiency or stalemate” of nuclear destruction was all 
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that was necessary.38 For the Navy, “winning” a nuclear war was neither the ultimate objective 
nor even a possible scenario considering the size and scope of nuclear destruction capable by the 
late 1950’s.39 In their assessment, nuclear war would wreak intolerable devastation upon all 
parties. In a 1957 memo circulated amongst top Navy officers, Rear Admiral Roy M. Johnson 
described this discrepancy of military branches as to what the their ultimate goal even was: 
“It has gradually become evident, as perhaps it should have from the start, that the basic 
disagreement [among the Joint Chiefs of Staff] is over objectives at that echelon where 
national security is defined, rather than over military means once specific tasks are 
assigned. This is not to say that indictment of SAC’s plans and demands on specific 
military points is not justified, but that it is somewhat aside from the main point. It seems 
evident that since deterrence of general war and maintenance of US security and values 
are the basic objectives, preparedness to fight and win a general war must subordinate 
itself to these objectives.”40 
What Rear Admiral Roy M. Johnson was deliberating in this memo was what ultimately 
did the United States’ government deem to be its higher priority: deterring war or ensuring 
victory? SAC and other Air Force officials believed ensuring victory to be their highest priority, 
and more importantly, still believed victory to be an attainable objective. The Navy thought 
otherwise—if only for the convenience of their own interests. 
 But the Navy’s somber assessment of US capabilities does not signify necessarily a more 
humane nuclear approach. Chief Naval Officer Admiral Arleigh Burke described finite 
deterrence as follows: “Our objectives can be assured by the selection of a target system which 
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will include the most vulnerable and essential elements of Soviet life; that is, the control 
structure of their government and the Communist Party, and the industrial complex which is the 
foundation of their national power.”41 Such a targeting system essentially called for the explicit 
targeting of cities which ironically the Air Force sought to avoid. Proponents of finite deterrence 
concluded that capping weapons necessitated that those being employed would crumble Soviet 
urban-industrial areas with little discrimination. This was so because the theory preferred 
deterrence over military victory. Instead of locating and targeting the growing number of Soviet 
military instillations, which would result in the continued growth of US weapons, finite 
deterrence could be finite because it targeted the heart of Soviet urban existence. 
 But despite the theoretical promise of finite deterrence, it arrived for discussion in the 
NSC at the poorest of times. Nuclear production in the United States began exponential growth 
around 1955. Whereas the US warhead count stood liberally at 2,000 in 1955 by 1960 that 
number stood at around 20,000—a 1,000 percent increase.42 Also, the US Congress was 
entrenched in a (what turned out to be illusory) fear that the Soviets held a considerable margin 
of bombers and then missiles over the United States. The national political climate was not 
conducive to a national policy that would ostensibly cap nuclear weapons production when the 
most immediate concern was that in fact atomic numbers may be too low.43 Coupled with the 
reality that no real humanitarian argument could be made in support of this policy, the theory of 
finite deterrence largely remained that—a theory. It would remain an unattainable fantasy for 
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Army and Navy officials until atomic parity was reach in the following decade, which by that 
point the fiscal argument behind finite deterrence was essentially benign. With the Polaris 
program, Navy officers had found other ways to once again assert their influence in nuclear 
policy and therefore no longer needed finite deterrence to prop up their strategic importance. In 
sum, finite deterrence was a theoretically possible alternative. Propped up by military 
opportunism it was given considerable attention toward the latter half of the 1950’s, but 
ultimately the political context of the day ensured it would not be held up to oppositional 
scrutiny. The navy found other avenues from which it would assert its importance leaving finite 
deterrence to fade from serious consideration moving forward. 
 In summary, this chapter has explored a portion of the alternative strategies considered, 
but never entirely implemented, during the founding years of the Cold War. Through the 
evaluation of their strengths, weaknesses, and uncertainties, I have provided some understanding 
as to what US officials considered to be the ultimate aims of nuclear policy and also what risks 
were unacceptably burdensome. These alternatives—Symmetrical & Superior Mobilization, 
Prevent Strike, Finite Deterrence—were deliberated as another nuclear strategy maintained 
supremacy. Just as SIOP-62 and its theoretical premise of Assured Destruction seem puzzling 
when viewed in a vacuum, it is crucial to understand the evolving strategy which placed the 
United States in a position to make that wartime plan feasibly usable. This chapter has explored 
the alternatives that now belong in the nuclear waste bin. In the following chapter I will explore 
the strategy that morphed into something far different from its intended design, but nevertheless 
maintains a definable continuity from the arms race’s earliest days under Trumane through its 
darkest hours under Kennedy. 
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Chapter 2 – The Path to Assured Destruction 
 
"Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily 
or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended 
to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group."44 – United Nations’ definition on genocide 
 
 To label an action or the potentiality of an action as genocidal as we see it is not the role 
of a historian. Yet it very well may be the role of a historian to understand how a state or body of 
states came to collectively agree upon a common definition of the term and then reflect upon 
how that description measures against the behavior of these states. In this regard, one can see 
how the definitions of warfare and genocide merged into a murky and indistinguishable blend. 
Beginning around 1954 the United States government had reached a capability “to kill 
nations.”45 The incongruity between their public assertions of what constituted as the most 
egregious of national acts—genocide—and what they privately prepared to commit were by no 
means harmonious. I included this definition not to assert a label upon developing operational 
plans and NSC doctrine through the latter half of the 1950’s, but to keep a point of reference 
regarding what was considered outside the bounds of decent state behavior, and how nuclear 
weapons seemed to transcend these boundaries altogether. 
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** ** Securing Victory ** ** 
The US-Soviet nuclear arms race can be described into two overlapping categories: the 
phase in which state officials believed a nuclear war could be won and the phase in which they 
believed nuclear war would result in unacceptable losses on both sides. In no one specific 
moment was this transition made, rather as the capability of nuclear arsenals matured so too did 
the thinking behind their potential use. The overarching objective in this first phase was 
acquiring nuclear capabilities which state officials deemed adequate in securing a US victory 
given an escalation of general conflict between the capitalist and communist spheres. This 
section will elaborate on some of this phase’s key documents. Through an assortment of official 
policy statements, wartime plans, and presidential strategies, I will shed light on what drove the 
president, his National Security Council, and Joint Chiefs of Staff to a deeper dependence on 
nuclear arms for geopolitical benefit and how this narrowed, instead of widened, future strategic 
options moving forward. 
 
NSC 30 & NSC 20/4 
 
 The first official U.S. nuclear policy report was released in September of 1948 under 
National Security Council directive 30 (or NSC-30). This document titled “United States Policy 
on Atomic Warfare” was the first attempt to define the role of nuclear armament under 
peacetime conditions. Attempts at the United Nations to internationalize ownership of nuclear 
research and resources had come to a standstill as the gaps between the US and Soviet proposals 
had proven to be irreconcilable. The point of contention was what would be internationalized 
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first: the US nuclear stockpile or all global nuclear programs. The Baruch plan submitted by the 
US proposed that all nuclear programs be internationalized first, and only then would the United 
States relinquish itself of its atomic monopoly. The Gromyko plan submitted by the Soviets 
demanded the opposite—that US nuclear weapons be internationalized before it would surrender 
its nuclear program to the global community. Essentially, so much distrust existed between these 
states that both sides feared a first move might lead to detrimental geopolitical leveraging of the 
other. More and more, the US began to realize that future nuclear uncertainties would be settled 
among states, not a collective international body. As I attempt to recast the Nuclear Arms race in 
a context of Nuclear History rather than merely a Cold War history, the abandoning of 
international control was a watershed moment. In no proceeding scenario was global cooperation 
regarding Nuclear Warfare been as feasible right after World War II nor will it likely ever be as 
simple of a process as it would have in in the late 1940’s. It is in this moment that the Nuclear 
Arms Race truly began. 
Given the ever-heightening tensions with the Soviet Union, U.S. policymakers were 
unwilling to set any limits as to the use of atomic weapons. In fact, this document affirmed that 
no such definition would, or even should, be given. To officially establish definitive parameters 
surrounding the use of atomic weaponry regardless of circumstantial context would be “a 
prescription preceding diagnosis”46: 
“The United States has nothing presently to gain, commensurable with the risk of raising 
the question, in either a well-defined or an equivocal decision that atomic weapons would 
be used in the event of war. An advance decision that atomic weapons will be used, if 
necessary, would presumably be of some use to the military planners. Such a decision does 
not appear essential, however, since the military can and will, in its absence, plan to exploit 
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every capability in the form of men, materials, resources and science this country has to 
offer.”47 
From the earliest days of nuclear policy formation, the long-term viability of strategic 
nuclear armament was largely disregarded. This document evinces that official policy served as 
an unambiguous removal of limitation upon war planners to pursue whatever action in wartime 
scenario they saw fit. Every aspect of the national resources available could potentially be 
utilized in order to construct a sound atomic arsenal. Government officials believed the U.S. 
atomic monopoly to be the only theoretical deterrent that prevented the U.S.S.R. from further 
military expansion. Therefore, to limit its development would be to limit U.S. interests 
throughout the world. A policy of unobstructed nuclear armament did not seriously consider the 
fiscal or societal consequences of its implementation. While armies and navies necessitated a 
period of mobilization before combat, it would not take long before the immediacy of air 
domination became viewed as essential in claiming military victory—thereby justifying the need 
for air power to be constantly maintained and nuclear arsenals continuously at the ready. 
While atomic planning was not to be regulated by the National Security Council, its 
general objectives were strikingly vague in the Cold War’s earliest years. NSC 20/4, an outline 
of official U.S. policy towards the U.S.S.R. and its communist bloc, directed a reduction of “the 
power and influence of the U.S.S.R. to limits which no longer constitute a threat to world peace, 
national independence and stability in the world family of nations.”48 US officials feared the 
communist ideology of the Soviets, but more importantly, they took alarm at the expansionary 
policy which the Kremlin actively disseminated among regional states. Coupled with impressive 
industrial output and the most formidable military across Eurasia, the NSC 20/4 considered the 
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Soviet Union to be the gravest threat to the security of the United States within the foreseeable 
future. 
It is at the intersection of these two directives—NSC 30 and NSC 20/4—that the 
quandary of U.S. policy regarding the Soviet Union became evident. These documents, 
implemented in tandem as U.S. policy, intended to mutually support one another. Yet the logic 
propelling each document was counterintuitive to the other. In NSC 30, war planners were given 
the authority to enact any means to achieve the objectives of NSC 20/4. Yet the goal of 
diminishing the Soviet threat to a level which would “no longer constitute a threat to world 
peace” is inherently at odds with increased military capability. A more threatening U.S. nuclear 
stance would become the impetus which drove the U.S.S.R. to itself become a greater military 
threat. “The growth of a U.S. nuclear capability,” Historian David Alan Rosenberg wrote, “was 
largely justified in terms of the need to counter a growing Soviet nuclear threat.”49 This race of 
arms was anticipated by NSC planners, and eventually become a routinely analyzed procedure 
by the NSC’s Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC). Instead of evaluating US dominance in the 
world as it stood, it became the job of the NESC to evaluate US superiority several years ahead 
of present conditions—a testament to the fluidity and instability in this era of atomic expansion. 
NSC 20/4 stated that Soviet capabilities “will progressively increase and that by no later 
than 1955 the USSR will probably be capable of serious air attacks against the United States with 
atomic, biological and chemical weapons.” 50 One nation’s dominance was relative to the other’s 
vulnerability.  Therefore, the objective “to counter” Soviet influence and capability was 
incompatible with the objective “to reduce” Soviet influence and capability—both phrases were 
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employed in these earliest NSC directives. No serious assessment was given as to how Soviet 
armament could be reduced. Instead, NSC 20/4 and NSC 30 focused on how the relative threat 
of Soviet armament could be reduced. By maintaining a faster rate of growth in both quantity 
and quality of military capability—atomic and otherwise—the National Security Council 
believed that the United States security would be maintained. This policy though would 
inevitably fail to reduce the long-term threat of Soviet arms. It plotted a course for exponential 
growth of atomic armament and unprecedented increases in military expenditures. Intended to be 
more than a wasted asset, the growth of these military forces meant operational planning willing 
to affect more violence than in any prior military engagement. 
The primary importance of NSC 30 and NSC 20/4 was the nuclear paradigms they made 
manifest across the U.S. nuclear bureaucracy. Rather than these NSC directives playing a 
decisive role in material production of nuclear arms, they served as an expression of the 
dilemmas from which policymakers could not escape in regard to nuclear thinking. Their 
emphasis on nuclear preponderance justified as a means to diminish “the USSR to limits which 
no longer constitute a threat to the peace”51 enabled military technocrats to be the judges of what 
constituted viable nuclear options. Nuclear victory became the business of agencies, 
commissions, and commands rather than presidents, cabinets, and councils. What exactly 
satisfied the requirement of deterrence and feasible wartime victory became an operational and 
technical feat—reducing or eliminating available alternatives for high-level officials. As 
historian John M. Curatola concluded: “Due to the lack of strategic guidance from the national 
political leadership and with little real understanding of atomic effects, the wartime operational 
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influences would dominate nuclear postwar planning efforts up into the 1950s.”52  Curatola 
argues in his book Bigger Bombs for a Brighter Tomorrow that the objectives outlined in these 
preliminary directives were not operationally feasible.53  The value of NSC 30 and NSC 20/4 
was the mode by which nuclear armament was to be conceptualized moving forward. They serve 
as a convenient starting point of atomic objectives, and a troubling example of how little nuclear 
strategy actually evolved. 
 
Offtackle 
 
 Upon the release of NSC 30 & NSC 20/4, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began aligning 
hypothetical wartime scenarios between the US and USSR with official policy. The JCS had 
actually begun constructing these operational plans as early as 1946, but without direction from 
the Truman administration or even much information from agencies regarding actual atomic 
capabilities.54 Interestingly enough though, these plans, proposed after NSC guidance was 
released, were quite similar to their unregulated predecessors. If anything, the unambiguous 
position of non-regulation within NSC 30 and NSC 20/4 emboldened JCS planners to continue 
maximizing target potentials and vital atomic resources—pressuring agencies such as the Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC) to ramp up their production of atomic weaponry and the Strategic 
Air Command (SAC) to acquire the necessary delivery system for atomic bombing. 
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 Offtackle was the United States’ first politically sanctioned war plan integrating atomic 
weapons with conventional air forces prepared in 1949.55 It was by far the most comprehensive 
air offensive list to date with 123 sites targeted. The plan called for five days of aircraft 
mobilization—mostly transporting bombers and their equipment to bases in the United Kingdom 
but some mobilization in the Pacific-Alaskan region as well. On day six, 211 bombers would 
leave UK and Alaskan bases targeting 32 Soviet targets scheduled to be completed within 4 
hours of takeoff. Of the 201 bombers departing from UK airports, 112 would proceed through a 
Scandinavian route in the North and entering the USSR near Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) 
while the remaining 89 would sweep down over the Black Sea before penetrating Soviet territory 
Southwest of the Ukraine. In total these forces were responsible with destroying 26 Soviet 
targets, while Pacific forces were responsible for six. Given the limited intelligence available, it 
was deemed that 60 sites were readily available for attack while 63 targets needed further 
reconnaissance.56 As US forces rolled across currently known targets, intelligence would be 
gathered on the remaining so that all 123 instillations could be eliminated. 
The second wave of attack would happen no later than 3 days after the first and by day 
30, all 123 targets would be struck. By the first three months of combat a total of 292 atomic 
weapons and 17,610 tons of conventional bombs would be dropped. The remainder of the plan 
covered 2 more years of conflict but became more ambiguous as unpredictable factors demanded 
flexibility while the war progressed.57 
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  The crucial elements of Offtackle lie not in its immediate operational feasibility, 
however. Indeed, General George Kenney of the US Air Force remarked, “It was quite evident to 
all … that Plan ‘Offtackle’ was decidedly unrealistic.”58 Rather it served as a convenient 
framework from which future war plans may be derived. First, it is based on the assumption that 
war would begin due to Soviet aggression. In so doing, it denied the possibility of a preventive 
US attack against the Soviets without provocation or warning and increased the possibility that 
Soviet aggression might destroy key wartime resources or disrupt vital communication lines 
prior to US mobilization. This was in line with the limitations provided by NSC 20/4 and it was 
also the most substantial limitation placed on operational planners. The concept of preventive 
attack (mentioned in the prior chapter) was not unanimously opposed by high-level officials 
though. General Kenney himself advocated for it, saying that in fact “It would not be preventive 
war, because we are already at war.”59 Nevertheless, at no point did the JCS fully support 
preventive war nor did a significant portion of the civilian members of the NSC. Therefore, 
unacceptable provocation by the Soviet Union continued to be a prerequisite for Offtackle and 
other war plans throughout the remainder of the Cold War. 
Second, the language of the plan alluded to a more holistic offensive strategy than 
previously devised. Preceding war plans called for air forces to be directed “against” vital Soviet 
war making centers, but Offtackle instructed air forces to "destroy" these centers.60 Indeed, the 
JCS approved a memo which stated that Offtackle would be able to “make the maximum 
contribution toward disrupting the vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity, force new 
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decisions [upon the enemy], and be immediate assistance in retarding the Soviet advances in 
Western Eurasia.”61 The categorization of war making capacities as vital components of the 
Soviet threat broadly expanded the urban-industrial centers which nuclear planners may target. 
Detectable in previous war plans, but increasingly so in Offtackle, the line between military and 
civilian target continued to blur. To be a contributor toward the gross domestic product of the 
Soviet Union would in essence be a qualifier of air offensive targeting. This basic tenet of 
nuclear planning formulated in the Cold War’s earliest years would be consistent throughout the 
nuclear arms race and a fundamental rationale behind the massive scope of SIOP-62 a decade 
later.62 
 Third, the JCS assembled an interservice committee to conduct a study of the effects of 
atomic bombing at around the same time Offtackle was being formulated. Their findings, 
expounded in a document entitled “the Harmon Report,” gave further impetus that atomic 
weapons must continue to be the chief reliant upon which United States security depends. The 
report stated: “From the standpoint of our national security, the advantages of its early use would 
be transcending. Every reasonable effort should be devoted to providing the means to be 
prepared for prompt and effective delivery of the maximum numbers of atomic bombs to 
appropriate target systems.”63 The war plan preceding Offtackle, entitled TROJAN, called for 
the targeting of 70 sites. This amount was estimated to destroy 35 to 40 percent of Soviet 
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industrial capacity and cause 6.7 million casualties—2.7 million of those being fatal. Offtackle 
though increased these targeting sites nearly 80 percent.64 Therefore, Offtackle reflected a 
growing consensus among policymakers: that a general conflict between the US and USSR will 
be determined by the swiftness and scope of atomic utilization. In effect, relative superiority of 
atomic yield and delivery effectiveness would be crucial. To continue this embittered rivalry, 
more elaborate, expensive, and deadly operational plans would be necessary if the United States 
was to maintain its perception of security. 
  
Eisenhower’s “New Look” Policy 
 
With the heightened sense of insecurity that accompanied the Korean War, US officials 
briefly adopted the policy of symmetrical mobilization as elaborated in NSC-68. The demands of 
this policy would not become permanent, but the military resources deemed necessary to counter 
Soviet aggression became substantially more available. As these documents emphasized the 
imminence of potential threat and the dependence upon military action at deterring such a threat, 
coupled with serious ambiguity regarding how atomic planning should be overseen, they reveal 
an administrative atmosphere conducive to military, particularly nuclear, expansionism, and new 
state apparatuses to organize and exploit this newfound military potential. President Eisenhower 
instituted what I categorize to be the “third phase” of pre-stalemate nuclear policy upon 
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assuming office in 1953. The remaining documents discussed will originate from his strategic 
outlines. 
Under no other presidential administration has the United States held as clearly 
articulated of a grand nuclear strategy as under Dwight Eisenhower.65  Through the introduction 
of his “New Look” defense strategy, the onus of Soviet deterrence would once again return to the 
U.S. nuclear arsenal. He viewed nuclear weapons as “an essential substitute for ruinous spending 
on larger conventional forces”66 and more ominously that “not just the possession of nuclear 
weapons but the credible inclination to use them”67 would be necessary if this defense strategy 
were to succeed. Therefore, it was under this strategy, elaborated in NSC-162/2, that a document 
such as the Single Integrated Operational Plan for fiscal year 1962 (SIOP-62) came to be 
possible. 
Published in October of 1953, NSC-162/2 admitted the eventual stalemate of the nuclear 
arms race. It states: 
“In the face of the developing Soviet threat, the broad aim of the U.S. security policies 
must be to create, prior to the achievement of mutual atomic plenty, conditions under 
which the United States and the free world coalition are prepared to meet the Soviet-
Communist threat with resolution…”68 
The National Security Council feared that in the process of nuclear armament, the Soviet 
Union may detect and exploit an advantageous moment to eliminate the threat posed by the 
United States and its allies—a preventive attack. Routine assessments of Soviet nuclear progress 
were implemented to ensure that “U.S. retaliatory capability cannot be neutralized by a surprise 
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Soviet attack.”69  With the military focus once again placed upon superior nuclear arms, NSC-
162/2 walked back claims from NSC-68 of an imminent Soviet danger. U.S. officials deemed the 
U.S.S.R. to be a rational state capable of assessing the threat to its own survivability if it were to 
provoke the United States into a general war. As long as the United States maintained a clearly 
visible nuclear potential, the peace could persist—the world could exist with both the United 
States and the Soviet Union for the foreseeable future. As statesman Brent Scowcroft once 
remarked: “The Cold War was not an acute crisis that had to be solved today; it was something 
we had to learn to live with.”70 
 This optimistic assessment of U.S.-Soviet coexistence though did pose problems 
which are evident throughout the document. If the Cold War conflict was to be a “slow burn” 
then the U.S. must form long-term fiscal solutions to an increasingly expensive question: How 
might the United States maintain nuclear supremacy for an indeterminate amount of time given a 
rapidly rising Soviet nuclear arsenal? From the outset of this directive, the NSC determined the 
“Basic Problems of National Security Policy” were “(a) To meet the Soviet threat to U.S. 
security,” and “(b) In doing so, to avoid seriously weakening the U.S. economy or undermining 
our fundamental values and institutions.”71 This worry is repeated throughout NSC-162/2. 
Paragraph 40 (b) summarizes the dilemma well: “The United States must, however, meet the 
necessary costs of the policies essential for its security. The actual level of such costs cannot be 
estimated until further study, but should keep to the minimum consistent with the carrying out of 
these policies.”72 Achieving a minimum cost while maintaining relative superiority were 
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counter-intuitive objectives. They were aware that a nuclear arms race, in which they determined 
the U.S. must always maintain an advantage, would require massive military expenditures. But 
they could not imagine any suitable alternative. NSC-162/2 assumed that the economic strength 
of a free-enterprise system could withstand the investment needed to ensure U.S. superiority 
until the “achievement of mutual atomic plenty.”73 Given the “efficiency” of threat these nuclear 
weapons achieved in comparison to a buildup of conventional forces, Eisenhower and the 
National Security Council under his administration judged nuclear deterrence to be the most 
bearable and adequate means of deterrence. 
This was not without producing further potential problems though. As nuclear deterrence 
came more and more to be seen as the only means of deterrence, the concept of “Massive 
Retaliation” began to appear in NSC policy planning. In its own words, NSC-162/2 called for 
“(1) A strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory 
damage by offensive striking power.”74  U.S. allied nations in Europe and Far East Asia were 
still vulnerable to an unimpeded invasion if Soviet strategy deemed it advantageous. 
Recognizing that the U.S. could not practically maintain the military manpower at these 
borderland locations as the Soviet Union or People’s Republic of China could, administrative 
officials relied on what John Lewis Gaddis termed “asymmetrical”75 threat—that is the invasion 
of any one U.S. ally would result in an unleashing of all U.S. nuclear capability. Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles described it this way in 1954: 
“We keep locks on our doors, but we do not have an armed guard in every home. We rely 
principally on a community security system so well equipped to punish any who break in and 
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steal that, in fact, would be aggressors are generally deterred […] We want, for ourselves and the 
other free nations, a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost.”76 
Therefore, the coupling of responsibility for a vast expanse of geopolitical space—from 
the Far East to West Germany—and with the obvious dissymmetry of manpower, Basic National 
Security Policies maintained a firm reliance upon the unthinkable option of massive retaliation. 
This maximum deterrent though only hastened the “fantastic compression of time”77 which states 
might mobilize its resources to wage war. Instead of a gradual and clearly evident mobilization 
of military capability, massive retaliation necessitated the immediate depletion of the U.S. 
nuclear stockpile in coordination with one another. “Whereas in the past, if [offensive striking 
capability] had failed to act, the United States still could mobilize forces, in the late air-atomic 
era, it must act immediately to avoid instant defeat.”78  In this sense, a sound defensive strategy 
would be, not the potential for a powerful buildup of military capability, but the sustained 
maintenance of the ultimate offensive capability. Within the rationality of NSC-162/2 and its 
preceding BNSP updates, a continually revised and expanded operational plans would be 
necessary in order to utilize all new atomic resources made available—ideally as a deterrent but 
potentially as a killer of nations. 
 
 
** ** Massive Retaliation ** ** 
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In the opening years of the Cold War, the use of nuclear weapons was considered a 
viable, albeit undesired, alternative. But as nuclear war came to be more and more consequential, 
the structure of US policy shifted. War with the Soviet Union would no longer be take years or 
months. Assessment of wartime scenarios determined the decisive moments of war to be nearer 
and nearer the point of initial aggression and at exponentially higher costs. This section considers 
the “fantastic compression of time” that emerged around the middle of the 1950’s, how it was 
perceived by US officialdom, and how wartime scenarios responded to these heightening stakes. 
 
“Fantastic Compression of Time” 1954-55 
 
 By 1954, the United States’ assessment of Soviet nuclear capabilities suggested an 
uncertain future for the US position of dominance. Both states had now successfully displayed 
their thermonuclear capabilities, and now only a matter of time stood between their present 
moment and the day of “greatest danger” when tensions between the two states—primarily 
growing due to nuclear expansion—might reach levels of maximum insecurity. Projections put 
this “time of greatest danger of a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States [around] mid-
1957,”79 only three years forward. The NSC, though, did not believe overt attack would be the 
Soviets strategy to expand its global influence. Instead they assumed the USSR would take the 
approach of “creeping expansion” as they called it—through subversive action. The NSC 
doubled down on their policy that given the outbreak of general war “the United States will wage 
it with all available weapons”80 so as to show no sign of hesitancy to the communist sphere 
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regarding US means of maintaining its security, and therefore substantial resources were put 
forth to maximize weapon and delivery systems availability. 
 SAC was the premier tool by which nuclear weapons would be delivered to their target 
location. In a briefing given to the representatives of all military services at the SAC 
headquarters, General Curtis Lemay, head of SAC, described to the other military branches the 
optimum plan of US wartime execution. Below is a Navy summary of his report: 
“It was estimated that SAC could lay down attack […] of 600-750 bombs by approaching 
Russia from many directions so as to hit their early warning screens. It would require 
about 2 hours from this moment until bombs had been dropped by using the bomb-as-
you-go system in which both BRAVO [nuclear] and DELTA [urban-industrial] targets 
would be hit as they reached them. […] The final impression was that virtually all of 
Russia would be nothing but a smoking, radiating ruin at the end of the two hours.”81 
Clearly, SAC planners had successfully compressed the moment of decisive action from months 
to hours. They determined that given a “Pearl Harbor-style” Soviet attack, between 8.9% to 90% 
of SAC capabilities would be destroyed—meaning essentially that they could not ascertain to 
what degree a surprise attack would affect the survival potential of their command.82 This in turn 
demanded further readiness and flexibility on the US nuclear arsenal as a moment of 
vulnerability in US posturing could result in the unwinding of deterrence and possibly an 
intolerable degree of damage against the state. 
 Throughout this period, regularly updated reports on the extent of potential damage the 
US could enact of the Soviet Union were being produced. Constructed in 1955, the Defense 
Department’s Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (or WSEG) produced a document titled 
“WSEG Report number 12” evaluating this damage and the manner in which it was to be 
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delivered. Report 12 in many ways was similar to previous wartime scenarios. Targets were 
separated into BRAVO, ROMEO, and DELTA (or blunting, retardation, and destruction) 
categories, and the report assumed that SAC’s “bomb as you go” system was standard procedure. 
It was determined that 118 out of 134 major Soviet cities would receive “calamitous damage” 
and that “the majority of skilled personnel living in those cities would be lost."83 
 When viewed in tandem, these documents represent the beginning phases of US massive 
retaliation operational tactic. While nuclear targets would be prioritized both military and 
industrial centers would be targeted. The execution of these bombing campaigns would be 
swift—no more than 2 hours upon their detection by Soviet radar. The reasoning for this 
overwhelming approach to nuclear bombardment was largely operational convenience. This 
reasoning was summarized succinctly by SAC commander General Moore: 
“Such an all-out attack would provide the largest degree of protection to SAC crews. By 
a predominant use of large nuclear weapons, moreover, one crew could be counted upon 
to destroy as many individual targets with single weapons, thus achieving a ‘bonus effect’ 
that was thought to be quite important in view of the many targets requiring destruction 
and limited size of the Strategic Air Command.”84 
As these national policies and operational procedures settled in as the new normal for 
nuclear planning, undetectable and massively destructive weaponry became necessary to 
maintain deterrence. Nuclear war was no longer bound within the traditional limitations of 
warfare. No real constraints were placed on what was and was not to be targeted and, if called 
upon to act, the US military would make its decisive blows before the day had ended. The era of 
                                                          
83 Briefing of WSEG Report No. 12 [Part of David Alan Rosenburg’s publication: “’Smoking Radiating Ruin at the 
End of Two Hours’: Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954-55.” 1981-2. 
84 Futrell, Lemmer, The Air Force and Strategic Deterrence, pg. 551-552. 
47 
 
conventional warfare methods was fading from view and the era of massive retaliation became 
the fast approaching vista of awe and terror. 
 
NSC 5602/1 
 
As mentioned in the prior chapter, the United States nuclear arsenal stood at 369 weapons 
in 1950.85 By 1959 that number grew to 12,305 and only two years later, as Eisenhower neared 
his last days in office, that number nearly doubled at over 23,000.86 The potential consequences 
of an immediate nuclear launch ensured that both the United States and the Soviet Union 
maintained ever-ready nuclear systems. Therefore, an unmitigated thermonuclear presence 
became the global norm. NSC-5602/1, the 1956 BNSP (or Basic National Security Policy) 
update, stated that “because of the increasing importance of forces-in-being in an age of nuclear 
weapons, economic and industrial potential for production after war begins is becoming a less 
dependable measure of the ability to achieve victory in general nuclear war than in past years.”87 
War potential had become so deadly that wholescale industrial capacities and urban centers of 
adversarial states were viable strategic targets for thermonuclear attack. Understanding that their 
enemy would also consider these targets viable, NSC officials came to realize the decimation 
that their own nation faced in the event of a general war.   
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NSC-5602/1 lays out quite accurately how the US-Soviet nuclear arms race would 
develop. It acknowledged the impeding shift of weapon delivery from aircraft to a hybrid of 
land-based ballistic missile, aircraft, and submarine-launched ballistic missile, and it accurately 
determined that the United States would hold an edge in these developments over the next few 
years. It also stated on several points, if ambiguously, how flexibility must be allowed into both 
location of the nuclear arsenal and the options available for use. The policy states: 
“They must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of 
malemployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. Such forces must 
not become so dependent on tactical nuclear capabilities that any decision to intervene 
against local aggression would probably be tantamount to a decision to use nuclear 
weapons. However, these forces must also have a flexible and selective nuclear 
capability, since the United States will not preclude itself from using nuclear weapons 
even in a local situation.”88 
Yet the document did not address how to in fact add further flexibility. Indeed, increasing 
Presidential nuclear options was an issue which stumped administrations for decades to come, 
but nevertheless, NSC-5602/1 clearly stated this as a potential issue not regularly recognized in 
prior official documentation. 
The policy also hinted toward a looming anxiety throughout the US policy sphere—the 
day of nuclear ultimatum where potentially the state must choose between an international loss 
of face or general nuclear war. “The United States and its allies must avoid getting themselves in 
a position,” it states, “where they must choose between (a) not responding to local aggression 
and (b) applying force in a way which our own people or our allies would consider entails undue 
risks of nuclear devastation.” This remained a chief concern throughout these years as the United 
States was not only engaged with its European allies, but in several geographic areas deemed of 
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high interest around the globe. Projection of US influence—in all its forms—was regarded as a 
necessity so that US interests could remain vivacious on a global scale. This fear was augmented 
by the technological advancement that made an all-out nuclear war all but intolerable. “A 
situation is approaching in which a total war involving use by both sides of available nuclear 
weapons could bring about such extensive destruction as to threaten the survival of both Western 
civilization and the Soviet system.”89 While past policy documents stated that nuclear parity was 
a concern in upcoming years, this NSC 5602/1 statement seems to suggests it was now a reality. 
Even as the nations’ two arsenals remained asymmetrical, the potential destruction of 
both the US and Soviet found the nuclear capability of the other to exceed the acceptable level of 
their own nations destruction. All alternatives to inciting such an instance would be considered 
before accepting that general war was necessary. Although still primitive in its language, NSC-
5602/1 began nuclear assessments of atomic parity that would become normative for the ensuing 
decades. It admitted how ill-prepared the United States was, or even could be, in defense of a 
Soviet nuclear attack and endeavored to find alternatives routes of coercion and influence in 
disrupting nefarious Soviet activity. This document is laced with the anxiety of a state stretched 
to distant reaches of the globe, determined not to lose that hold, and self-conscious of how a 
global retraction might diminish its international repute. In many ways NSC-5602/1 is a snapshot 
of transition between the old age of the tolerable weaponized atom and new age of its 
unspeakable use. 
 
SAC Targeting Plan for 1959 
                                                          
89 US National Security Council, “NSC 5602/1:  Basic National Security Policy,” March 15, 1956. 
50 
 
 
 A recently declassified SAC targeting plan titled Atomic Weapons Requirements Study 
for 1959 reveals the extent and nature of bombing operations that the US Air Force developed 
given an escalation of hostilities by the year 1959. Dr. William Burr of the National Security 
Archive (or NSA) states that this document “provides the most comprehensive and detailed list 
of nuclear targets and target systems that has ever been declassified.”90 While this document is 
only one snapshot of SAC planning among an archive of declassified and still classified SAC 
targeting studies, how closely it aligned with the mainstream air-atomic dominance theory of the 
day evinces that its contents are not an outlier of Air Force thinking. Some of its specific 
targeting categories are unprecedented when compared to other wartime plans available for 
public analysis, but this may possibly be due to the continued classification of similar documents 
or redaction from these plans’ targeting categories and not necessarily because this is a fringe 
study with little support. The breadth of this work suggests that the resources necessary for its 
creation would not be allocated if not seriously considered. Likewise, the study claims the basis 
of its creation on the authority of a JCS directive SK129-56 and JCS message 399095, 152849 in 
March of 1956. It is likely that this targeting list, when compared to the overarching objectives of 
war plans prior to and preceding this study and the methodical approach this document conveys 
in its targeting objectives and analysis, this list was a normative assessment of necessary attack 
locations to ensure what the Air Force deemed to be a US victory. 
 The overriding structure of this SAC study does not vary the framework of 
previous tactic of nuclear delivery. Its most fundamental objectives were to: “(1) Win the Air 
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Power Battle by Destroying SovBloc Air Power. (2) Destroy Systematically SovBloc War-
Supporting Resources.”91 To accomplish this the document employed the JCS-established 
targeting categories of BRAVO targets (blunting of Soviet counteroffensive), ROMEO targets 
(retardation of soviet troop advancement westward throughout Europe), and DELTA targets 
(disruption/destruction of the Soviet economic base) to be the basis of target organization. As the 
study states, “These objectives are basic and valid,” suggesting no substantial deviation from 
former procedures. Upon the engagement of general hostilities, SAC forces would work to 
prioritize the destruction of Soviet air forces and air offensive threats. Atomic forces, defense 
forces, and tactical forces would be targeted first followed by Soviet bloc air bases, launching 
sites and depots, and atomic stockpile sites. Once the Soviet air threat had been neutralized, 
focus would shift towards DELTA targets—military and governmental control centers as well as 
air industry resources to render not only present, but future air capability paralyzed as well. “It is 
here that the enemy’s basic industries are brought [under?] attack,” the study reads, “and the 
final blows are brought to bear against his economic base and his remaining government 
structure, with attendant physical, sociological, and psychological effect.”92 
The plan called for the destruction of 5975 targets, 938 of which are designated as 
DELTA targets, and builds into this plan duplications of target destruction to ensure more 
valuable targets have higher probabilities of successful termination. These probabilities range 
from 50% to 70% to 90% in likelihood of destruction. The study also does not consider the 
effects of thermal or radiation destruction as “both are relatively ineffective compared with 
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blast.”93 It goes on to say “radiation effects are particularly ineffective in terms of time, due to 
their delayed arrival and subsequent decay.” 
Also, included in this study is the list of every targeted city corresponded by the 
categories of intended industrial destruction within each city. This may be the only publicly 
available description of what specific targets nuclear bombardment aimed to destroy. The list did 
not differentiate between national borders and only differentiated between the three “zones” of 
communist control (USSR, Communist China, and Soviet Satellites) in order of priority. Most 
ominously, this categorization described “population” as one of several dozen intended 
categories of destruction. Virtually every city attacked included population as one of several 
categories intended to destroy. The complete targeting list includes well over one thousand cities 
from Beijing, China to East Berlin, East Germany in what it terms “systematic destruction.” 
Within the five major communist cities alone—Beijing, Leningrad, Moscow, Warsaw, and East 
Berlin—this SAC study called for the decimation of 19 population centers.94 This targeting list 
reveals that targets of capital (factories, equipment, etc.) were not the only industrial resources 
directed to be eliminated, but that dense sources of labor were also seen as essential in order for 
“the final blows [to be] brought to bear.”  
The Atomic Weapons Requirements Study for 1959 recasted the nature of nuclear 
planning as an amoral operation. Nuclear planners considered congregated sources of labor to be 
one cog of the larger industrial behemoth that the Soviet might employ against the United States. 
                                                          
93 The SAC [Strategic Air Command] Atomic Weapons Requirements Study for 1959. Title page, table of Contents 
and introduction. Posted on the Electronic Briefing Book “U.S. Cold War Nuclear Target Lists Declassified for First 
Time,” by Dr. Burr on the National Security Archives. Posted - December 22, 2015. 
94 An interactive map of these cities and their target categorization was accomplished by Dr. William Burr on the 
Electronic Briefing Book “U.S. Cold War Nuclear Target Lists Declassified for First Time,” in National Security 
Archives digital page, which can be found at: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb538-Cold-War-Nuclear-
Target-List-Declassified-First-Ever/#_edn4  
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They determined explicit depopulation as a viable targeting measure in order to achieve US 
objectives. In this regard, mass extermination of human life planned by SAC was not a 
byproduct of nuclear warfare. Mass extermination was itself the ultimate aim. This study, 
seemingly standard protocol for SAC, disregarded international norms of the day and would 
potentially have been labeled as genocidal planning.95 In its opening mission statement, the study 
states: 
“In the event of general war, the mission of the Strategic Air Command is to conduct 
global strategic air warfare in support of US national and military objectives utilizing 
atomic and nuclear weapons. In view of the growing Soviet threat to the US and its 
Allies, as well as the increasing Soviet capability to launch an atomic offensive against 
them, the accomplishment of the SAC mission must be realized through the execution of 
[air power dominance and the systematic destruction of the SovBloc war-supporting 
resources].” 
To be employable, to be able bodied, to be of sound mind—these are the human traits that 
qualified Soviets as potential “war-supporting resources.” Just as steel mills and ammunition 
factories were vital tools in the Soviet war-making effort, so too were the people who might 
operate them. This study revealed how international enmity coupled with thermonuclear 
armament demanded a readiness by the state to annihilate any inputs required for Taylorian 
manufacturing or the urban environments which made Taylorian manufacturing possible. This 
plan went beyond the destruction of militaries or their commanding outputs. SAC intended to 
unwind the very fabric of a society. Industrialism and urbanization—the essence of technological 
progress—when within the confounds of “SovBloc” control was viewed as threatening. 
Countries could be killed. Cities could be sanitized. The United Stated developed these 
extraordinary capabilities so that its global interests may be maintained. The Atomic Weapons 
                                                          
95 The SAC [Strategic Air Command] Atomic Weapons Requirements Study for 1959. Title page, table of Contents 
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Requirements Study for 1959 is the most honest depiction of nuclear war discussed in this 
chapter. The totality of its execution is not explained in ambiguous terminology, but as 
calculated statistics. As Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara refused to accept the calamity of 
SIOP-62 and the rigidity by which it demanded these actions be taken, it was the intended 
depopulation of entire nations that moved McNamara to find some other alternative. What 
constituted a military victory was beyond the bounds of his own political will. In the end though, 
the compulsion towards state security trumped his detestation for nuclear exchange and the 
potential for these nuclear atrocities persisted—both in that day and into our own. 
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Conclusion 
 
“…the essence of totalitarian government, and perhaps the nature of every bureaucracy, 
is to make functionaries and mere cogs in the administrative machinery out of men, and thus to 
dehumanize them.” – Hannah Arendt 
 
Once again, I return to the idea of the United States’ nuclear dilemma existing in a 
quandary. The opposing interests of the military in assuring a wartime victory and the political 
desire for national survival post-nuclear war were not and cannot be compatible. Through this 
paper, I have laid out several of the alternatives available to the US government and how massive 
retaliation as an operational plan and assured destruction as a national policy remained the 
continued nuclear positioning throughout the nuclear arms race. By contrasting a variety of 
nuclear alternatives—flexible response, symmetrical mobilization, finite deterrence, and 
preventive attack—I have shown how massive retaliation and assured destruction were not 
merely presidential preferences, but the most viable option for national survival that, despite 
various attempts to enact new policies, spanned across historical particularities, party affiliation, 
or leadership style. 
At an NSC meeting in 1958, President Eisenhower quipped “…that he could remember 
well when the military used to have no more than 70 targets in the Soviet Union and believed 
that destruction of these 70 targets would be sufficient. Now, however, a great many more targets 
had been added.”96 Still moments later, he gave his approval of the nuclear targeting of all Soviet 
cities over the population of 25,000. In a matter of 10 years the capacities of another general war 
                                                          
96 Memorandum, "Discussion at the 387th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, November 20, 
1958," November 20, 1958, Top Secret 
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grew exponentially. No longer was it a struggle to dominate one’s military and capture their 
cities, but to eviscerate their national livelihood entirely. 
While presidential oversight certainly played a role in the guidance of nuclear strategy, it 
should be noted how autonomous the nuclear-industrial complex came to be throughout 
Eisenhower’s administration and onward. A 1960 NSC memorandum on a proposal to reach a 
potential bilateral agreement with the Soviets to cut off of fissile materials production is very 
telling to the nature of the larger nuclear capabilities’ system. In this document, President 
Eisenhower expresses his deep conviction that some sort of agreement needed to be reached. 
“We can't go on the way we are,” he said, “with the nuclear build-up and the spread of 
capabilities.”97 The Defense Department was hesitant to agree—noting the potential 
vulnerabilities that could arise from cutting off fissile production for US nuclear arsenals. The 
President then said that “the Defense analysis appeared to him one-sided and in a vacuum. It 
stressed the effects of a cut-off on the U.S. without looking at the effects on the Soviet Union. He 
thought that any equitable arrangement leading to mutual inspection was in our interest.”98 While 
it is an often-said proverb by historians to avoid analyzing an event or phenomenon “in a 
vacuum,” the President of the United States expressed concern that Defense policy was often 
constructed exactly that way. Deterrence as a theoretical concept was never tied down to a 
quantifiable value of measurement that could be broadly accepted. It held different meanings to 
the strategist who spoke of its necessity. Therefore, much of the justification for these plans, and 
                                                          
97 Memorandum of Conversation Prepared by Philip Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic 
Energy Affairs, "NSC Meeting on Nuclear Cutoff," 18 February 1960, Secret (Note 13) 
Location of original:  RG 59, Policy Planning Staff Records 1954-1962, box 116, Atomic Energy - Armaments 1960 
98 Ibid. 
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the deterrence they ensured, cannot be tied to specific events aside from the initial success of 
detonating atomic, and then thermonuclear, weapons. 
Nuclear plans were not analyzed exogenously—in that any one geopolitical maneuver 
significantly altered the design of nuclear strategic course. Instead, it was an endogenous craft—
the degree which “we” perceive our survivability to be threatened by “them.” The imminence of 
this threat rose and fell over the decades, but any change in threat never redirected how nuclear 
deployment would function. In essence, those who formed nuclear plans were academics—
economists, mathematicians, scientists—who operated under the loose restrictions of NSC 
directives to find the most effective and efficient means to destroy a nation. The studies of these 
scientists “were scientific, so it was thought; there were numbers, calculations, rigorously 
checked, sometimes figured on a computer. Maybe the numbers were questionable, but they 
were tangible unlike the theorizing, the Kreminology, the academic historical research and 
interpretation. [One influential scientist] snootily denigrated all such work as being in ‘the essay 
tradition.’”99 Their conclusions were empirical: what degree of target destruction can be 
achieved with X number of B-52 bombers? And they sneered down upon those who attempted to 
grapple the Cold War as an issue of history, of political science, of unpredictable human 
behavior. In many respects, their plans were created in a vacuum—ignoring the unfolding 
geopolitical events, neglecting the complexities of how nuclear capability changed state 
behavior. 
External events certainly did play a role in effecting nuclear saber rattling—the Korean 
War as mentioned before, as well as others such as the escalating conflict in Vietnam and the 
                                                          
99 Fred Kaplan’s The Wizards of Armageddon explains in great detail this disconnect between theoretical 
conceptualization of the consequences & application of nuclear capability and their real time quantifiable utility 
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Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 became so tense because nuclear warfare was becoming 
increasingly likely. The Berlin Crises and Cuban Missile Crisis certainly affected the potential 
for the use of nuclear weapons. But these events, in their respect to nuclear policy, should be 
viewed as escalations in a pre-determined nuclear trajectory, not substantial deviations on their 
own. The Cuban Missile Crisis did not change the way nuclear planners went about crafting 
nuclear bombardment—instead it affected the likelihood that these plans might actually be 
employed. Therefore, nuclear planning is a frightening example of military strength that was in 
fact, at least partially, constructed within a vacuum. 
What I have argued is that the nature of nuclear tactic is inalterable. No personal impulse 
towards humanitarianism nor hawkish drive for a fully mobilized military can forgo the 
dependency upon nuclear weapons for perceived national survival. Yet this very capability is 
what has drawn the world to a real possibility of global genocide. When reviewing the final 
general war plans approved under the Eisenhower Administration, military commander Harry 
Felt commented that considering the global consequences such a thermonuclear bombardment 
would unleash, “our weapons can be a hazard to ourselves as well as our enemy.”100 Using 
nuclear weapons had no practical utility for it posed a risk to all of the world regardless of 
national borders, yet their disposal paradoxically remained impossible. Similarly, Robert 
McNamara said in an interview once: 
“…under no circumstances should [the U.S. and its NATO allies] ever initiate the use of 
nuclear weapons. I believed it then, I believe it today. Nuclear weapons have no military 
utility whatsoever, excepting only to deter one's opponent from their use. Which means 
you should never initiate their use against a nuclear-equipped opponent. If you do, it's 
suicide.”101 
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If its ultimate utility is to deter other nations from attack, and this deterrence is built upon the 
real possibility that they could be used, then is this not an admittance of the futility of nuclear 
armament? Grappling with the logic of nuclear weapons is not a finite process. To argue for and 
against nuclear weapons, the deterrence they command, and the destruction of their potential, 
one would never reach an ending point. It is a cyclical logic that is never resolved or self-
satisfied. With states at the helm of nuclear potential, they will persist in a quandary of military 
and political interests, and with the current global ecological system hanging in the balance. As 
globalization continues to fracture the arbitrary boundaries that organize what is “us” and what is 
“them” let nuclear policy of the past be a reminder of how imagined these to concepts truly are. 
States which aim to disregard the security of others in order to prop up the security of their own 
will ultimate fail, and leave all the world as a whole worse off. Only as we realize our collective 
interest in nuclear weapons as a species—as a living, sentient organism perhaps—will this threat 
to our survival diminish, and a new logic of nuclear armament can unravel our current quandary. 
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